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Appellant, Michael D. Ferguson ("Michael"), by and through his attorneys of record, Holden,
Kidwell, Hahn & Crap, P.L.L.C., hereby submits Appellant's Reply Brief.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Successor Trustees Breached Their Fiduciary Duty to Allow Michael Access to
"Relevant" Information Concerning Administration of the Trust.
At first glance, this case appears to be somewhat complex and requires consideration of

numerous legal issues and facts. In fact, it is not complex at all. The pivotal facts concerning the
Successor Trustees' breach of their duty to provide relevant information concerning the
administration of the Trust are not disputed. Specifically, without dispute, the Successor Trustees
refused and continue to refuse to allow Michael access to Trust records relating to Trust
administration prior to the date of Sybil's death on May 25, 2015. 1 The Successor Trustees admit
as much in their Respondents' Brief. 2 Upon Roger's death, Sybil's community and separate property
was to be allocated to a separate Trust referred to as the "Survivor's Trust" and was to be
administered as provided in Article 8 of the Trust Agreement; on the other hand, Roger's property
was allocated among the Marital Trusts. (R., pp. 271,274). As a beneficiary of the Survivor's Trust
only, it is essential for Michael to be able to verify that a proper allocation had been made between
the Survivor's Trust and the Marital Trusts. Without a starting point reflecting the identity, nature
and value of the property transferred into the Survivor's Trust at Roger's death, it is impossible for
Michael to determine the amount ofhis share of the Survivor's Trust and if the Survivor's Trust had

1

See R., pp. 133, 135-38 (,r 10 of the Successor Trustees' Answer and their Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eight, and Ninth
Affirmative Defenses); see also R., p. 440 (ii 7 of the Successor Trustees' Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs Interrogatories);
R., pp. 245-47 (iii! 19-22); R., pp. 342-45 (the Successor Trustees' Interim Accounting); Tr. p. 46, 11. 4-10.
2

See Respondents' Brief, p. 7 ("All of the information provided to Michael by the Successor Trustees was for the period
from and after Sybil's death"); see also R., pp. 241-42 (Aff. of Michael Ferguson, ,r,r 11-12).

2
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been administered properly. 3 Moreover, what Sybil did with those assets after the initial allocation
is also critical for determining the identity and value of assets remaining in the Survivor's Trust at
her death.
The Successor Trustees argue that they fulfilled their duty by providing Michael with copies
of Sybil's estate tax return and an interim inventory of the Survivor's Trust at Sybil's death, along
with copies of various bank statements kept by Sybil. 4 However, by their own admission, the initial
inventory and interim accounting only reflected Trust administration after Sybil's death5, and
provided no information concerning the administration of the Trust prior to her death. Moreover,
the bank statements provided to Michael prior to the initiation of this action reflected only cash
transactions and disbursements from Trust bank accounts after Sybil's death and contained no
information whatsoever concerning sales, dispositions or transfers of real property or other
investments held by the Survivor's Trust prior to Sybil's death. 6 The estate tax return was apparently
prepared by the Successor Trustees and they did not provide Michael any supporting documentation
regarding the basis for the values placed on assets included therein or any explanation for its
omission of certain assets known to be owned by Roger and Sybil at or before Roger's death. 7 The
Initial Inventory prepared by the Successor Trustees did not include any of the supporting documents
or Trust records kept by Sybil prior to her death or reflect any information from before Sybil's

3

See R., pp. 206-07 (Aff. of David Smith, ,T,T 7-9); R., p. 241 (Aff. of Michael Ferguson, ,T 11).

4

See Respondents' Brief., p. 7.

5

Jd.; see also R., p. 246 (Aff. of Michael Ferguson, ,T 20).

6

7
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See R., p. 246 (Aff. of Michael Ferguson, ,T 20).

See R., pp. 238-53 (Aff. of Michael Ferguson, ,T,T 6-29).
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death. 8 By refusing to provide Michael access to any records or information from prior to Sybil's
death, the Successor Trustees have deprived Michael of any ability to verify whether or not the Initial
Inventory was accurate or complete. In essence, the Successor Trustees' position was "trust us,"9
notwithstanding that there was an inherent conflict of interest created by the fact that the sibling
trustees were beneficiaries of both the Survivor's Trust and the Marital Trusts, whereas Michael was
only a beneficiary of the Survivor's Trust. Without access to any records relating to the time prior
to Sybil's death, Michael has no way of determining if assets in the Survivor's Trust had been
improperly sold, transferred or gifted to the Sibling Trustees or persons in violation of express Trust
dispositive provisions. 10
On appeal, the District Court reversed the Magistrate's conclusion that Michael did not
become a beneficiary until Sybil died. (R., pp. 865-66 (Decision on Appeal, pp. 5-6)). Specifically,
the District Court held that the Magistrate's conclusion that Michael's interest in the Survivor's Trust
did not arise until Sybil's death was incorrect. (R., p. 865 ("Michael became a 'beneficiary' under
the terms of the Survivor's Trust when Sybil executed her Last Will and Testament on October 3,
2015. " (emphasis added)). The Successor Trustees have not appealed from that holding. Thus, as

8

See R., p. 340 (Inventory).

9
In fact, the Successor Trustees continue to assert this point, stating: "Michael refuses to believe the information the
Successor Trustees already have provided, although he has no evidence indicating that the information is not accurate."
(Respondents' Brief, p. 24). But why is Michael-or any beneficiary-required to accept without reservation a trustee's word for
anything without being able to review the underlying records and documents? Why is Michael being accused of trying to "pressure
and intimidate" the Successor Trustees" (Respondents' Brief, p. 24 ), just for enforcing his rights as a beneficiary to receive relevant
trust records? How is Michael's demand that the Successor Trustees comply with their fiduciary duties "unreasonable"?
(Respondents' Brief, p. 24).
1

OF or example, one ofthe Successor Trustees' claims is that before her death Sybil had verbally gifted her interest in a large,
expensive residence in Bonneville County, Idaho, (the Quail Ridge property) to Xarissa- an asset which otherwise would have been
an asset in the Survivor's Trust. See§ 2.01 of Sybil's Will. R. p. 310. After Sybil died, the sibling trustees transferred Sybil's
interest in such residence following their appointment as personal representatives of Sybil's estate in Arizona, apparently based solely
upon such undocumented verbal gift. See,, 14-17, Aff. of Michael Ferguson. R. pp. 242-245.

4
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a beneficiary of the Trust, both before and after Sybil's death, Michael was entitled to be "reasonably
informed of the trust and its administration," to "a copy of the terms of the trust" and with "relevant
information about the assets of the trust and the particulars relating to the administration." Idaho
Code§ 15-7-303(b). Moreover,§ 18.10 of the Trust requires the Trustee to make "financial records
and documentation of the Trust available to beneficiaries at reasonable times and upon reasonable
notice." (R., p. 294). In sum, the Successor Trustees' breach of their duties to allow Michael access
to Trust records-including those from before Sybil's death-is crystal clear.
In its Memorandum Decision, the Magistrate held that Michael's request for access to Trust

records was not relevant based upon the erroneous premise that Michael did not become a
beneficiary until Sybil died. 11 Upon appeal to the District Court, the District Court ignored
Michael's request for a reversal of the Magistrate's determination concerning the relevancy of
Michael's request for records access, despite the fact that the underlying premise of the Magistrate's
decision was reversed (i.e., that Michael did not become a beneficiary until Sybil's death). The
District Court skipped all of the analysis relating to Michael's right to access Trust records or the
Successor Trustees' breaches and instead concluded that Michael forfeited his interest in the
Survivor's Trust even though it was undisputed that the Arizona Petition was filed solely to prevent
the running of the Arizona limitations period on filing a claim. From the District Court's eager leap
to consider the forfeiture question without considering Michael's rights or the Successor Trustees'
breaches, springs all of the subsidiary issues upon which the Respondents' arguments here are based.

11

It should be noted here that even under the Magistrate's erroneous interpretation of the Trust, Michael was still entitled
access to those records because he was most certainly a beneficiary at the time of Sybil's death. (See R., p. 693).

5 -
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Had the District Court properly recognized Michael’s entitlement to access to Trust records,
it would have been clear that the Successor Trustees breached their fiduciary duties and were using
their own breach as a means to facilitate their argument that the Forfeiture Clause was called into
play by Michael’s actions. Further, the District Court also ignored Michael’s argument that he was
entitled to discovery concerning the existence of probable cause in order to defend against the
Successor Trustees’ probable cause argument. Thus, notwithstanding that the Successor Trustees
first raised the alleged lack of probable cause as a basis for their claim for application of the
Forfeiture Clause, they still refused to provide Michael access to Trust records that would have
enabled him to defend against the Successor Trustees’ new defense. The Successor Trustees cannot
have it both ways—that is, they cannot raise the issue of a lack of probable cause as a basis for
claiming the applicability of the Forfeiture Clause and then refuse Michael’s discovery request for
information necessary to defend against the Successor Trustees’ claim.
In sum, District Court erred in refusing to consider the validity of Michael’s claim for access
to Trust records and in refusing to consider his discovery request for Trust documentation concerning
the administration of the Trust prior to Sybil’s death. The District Court should have deferred
considering the enforceability of the Forfeiture Clause until after Michael had been given fair
opportunity to review Trust administrative documentation, thereby affording him with a meaningful
opportunity to consider whether to pursue his Arizona Petition.
II.

By Breaching Their Fiduciary Duties, the Successor Trustees Impeded the
Administration of the Trust, Thereby Precluding Their Resort to the Forfeiture Clause.
Under the common law, a provision in a trust that relieves a trustee of liability for breach of

trust is not enforceable to the extent it purports to relieve the trustee from liability for breach of trust

6
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in bad faith or with indifference to the fiduciary duties of the trustee or the terms or purposes of the
trust or the interest of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, to the extent that such clause interferes with
enforcement or proper administration of the trust, such clause is likewise not enforceable. These
principles of law are stated in Restatement (Third) of Trusts as follows:
( 1) A provision in the terms of a trust that relieves a trustee of liability for breach of
trust, and that was not included in the instrument as a result of the trustee's abuse of
a fiduciary or confidential relationship, is enforceable except to the extent that it
purports to relieve the trustee:
(a) ofliability for a breach oftrust in badfaith or with indifference to the
fiduciary duties of the trustee, the terms or the purposes of the trust, or
the interest of the beneficiaries, or
(b) of accountability for profits derived from a breach of trust.

(2) A no contest clause shall not be enforced to the extent that doing so would
interfere with the enforcement or proper administration of the trust.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 96 (2007) (italics added). In its Memorandum Decision, the District
Court gave only a token acknowledgment of these limitations on the enforceability of the Trust's
Forfeiture Clause and hastily skipped to the question of whether or not there was probable cause for
Michael's commencement of the Arizona Petition. Specifically, the District Court stated that:
[T]he record is clear that neither the Original Trust, the Shelter Trust nor
the Will imposed any fiduciary duty on Sybil towards Michael prior to her
death. Absent a fiduciary duty, it would not be reasonable for Michael or
his lawyers to conclude that he would be entitled to an accounting of the
Trust's financial records before Sybil's death.
(R., p. 872). From that erroneous premise, the District Court then found that Michael had not
demonstrated there was probable cause for filing the Arizona Petition. 12 Specifically, the District

12

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-24, for a discussion of common law fiduciary duties imposed upon trustees of a trust, as

well as a discussion of express fiduciary duties set forth in the Trust.

7
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Court ignored the Successor Trustees' breaches of their fiduciary duties to Michael regarding his
entitlement to review Trust records and also ignored the Successor Trustees' refusal to respond to
Michael's discovery requests that were necessary to defend against the Successor Trustees' claim
that no probable cause had been shown. The District Court's conclusion is particularly glaring since
the Successor Trustees raised this issue some ten months after this action was commenced and they
were the ones who first who put the probable cause question in issue.
The Successor Trustees entirely gloss over their own breach of duties and mis-characterize
Michael's claims regarding his entitlement to access to Trust records. Specifically, they infer that
the Forfeiture Clause is enforceable since the, "Trust Agreement imposed no obligation on either
Roger or Sybil to ensure that any particular asset or any particular value of assets remained in the
Survivor's Trust or went to any particular person at the survivor's death." (Respondents' Brief, p.
18). Michael has never argued that Sybil was duty-bound to leave assets in the Survivor's Trust and
Respondents' claim that Michael's argument was so based is misleading. 13 Likewise, the Successor
Trustees' enumeration of the general purposes of the Forfeiture Clause to support the conclusion that
the clause is not void against public policy is also misleading. (Respondents' Brief, p. 19). It is not
the text of the Forfeiture Clause nor the purposes listed by the Successor Trustees that are violative
of public policy-rather, it is the Successor Trustees' invocation of the Forfeiture Clause here, where
their own feet-dragging and breaches of fiduciary duties precipitated Michael's need to file the
Arizona Petition in order to prevent the running of the Arizona statute of limitation.
Michael takes strong issue with the District Court's conclusion that, "The forfeiture provision
does not interfere with enforcement or proper administration of the Shelter Trust because Sybil owed
13

8 -
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no fiduciary duty to any of the beneficiaries." ( R., p. 874). As noted in Michael's Appellant's Brief,
as long as there were assets in the Survivor's Trust, Sybil owed duties to all Trust beneficiaries and
access to Trust records concerning such administration is necessary in order to determine whether
or not Sybil had properly performed her duty to properly allocate Trust assets and administer the
Trust. Michael also takes issue with the District Court's sweeping inference that Sybil's right to
invade Trust assets for her own purposes negated any and all duties owed to the Trust beneficiaries. 14
In sum, Michael has never contested Sybil's right to use Trust assets for her own purposes and
Respondents' mischaracterization of Michael's arguments is very misleading.
The District Court's conclusion that no duties were owed to Michael or any of the other
beneficiaries based upon Sybil's right to invade the Trust corpus is patently erroneous. Michael has
never contested Sybil's right to use Trust assets for her own purposes nor ever asserted that such
right was violative of public policy or that Sybil had a duty to leave assets in the Survivor's Trust
at her death. Rather, Michael's only argument is that the Successor Trustees' refusal to allow him
access to Trust records impeded proper administration of the Trust. The Successor Trustees should
not be allowed to sandbag Michael's right to access relevant records and then assert the Forfeiture
Clause when Michael takes steps to preserve his right to determine if the Survivor's Trust was
properly administered.

14

In its Decision on Appeal the District Court makes the following erroneous inference concerning the effect of Sybil's
right to use Trust assets for her purposes: "Had there been a duty to preserve any portion of the corpus of the Trust ... then such
forfeiture provision might be troublesome; however this is not that kind ofTrust. Michael's interests were strictly limited to his share
of the remaining assets, if any, that were designated for him. Anything else he might have expected to receive - but now believes
was missing from the estate - was Sybil's to use and dispose of how she saw fit." Decision on Appeal, p. 14, R. p. 874. (Italics
added)
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III.

The Court Should Rejectthe Successor Trustees' Argument That There Is No Probable
Cause Limitation upon the Enforcement of Forfeiture Clauses in Revocable Trust
Agreements.
The Successor Trustees argue that the Forfeiture Clause should be enforced against Michael

because he submitted no evidence of probable cause for commencement of the Arizona Petition.

(See Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-23). They premise this argument on the fact that Idaho Code§ 153-905 applies only to wills and not to trusts. The Successor Trustees again misconstrue Michael's
argument in that regard. Michael's argument is not now and never was based upon Idaho Code §
15-3-905, rather it was based upon common law principles and upon substantial case law in other
jurisdictions which have imposed a "probable cause" limitation upon enforcement of in terrorum
clauses in trusts. Michael has consistently acknowledged that LC. § 15-3-905 is limited solely to
wills and the Successor Trustees distort Michael's argument when they suggest his argument is based
solely upon LC. § 15-3-905. 15
The Successor Trustees also urge this Court to reject a probable cause limitation based upon
the singular Wyoming case of EWG v. First Federal Savings Banko/Sheridan, 413 P.3d 106, 110111 (Wyo. 2018). (See Respondents' Brief, p. 22). However, the Successor Trustees did not make
this argument in the proceedings below and in fact expressly acknowledged and relied upon the
probable cause requirement in their own arguments. 16 As such, they cannot now raise this issue for
the first time on appeal, especially where they have not appealed the District Court's finding that

15

See R., pp. 753-755 (incorporated herein by reference).

16

See Respondents' Brief, pp. 28-29; see also R., pp. 633,637 (Successor Trustees' assertions ofa lack of probable cause
to the magistrate); R., pp. 660, 662 (Magistrate's acknowledgment that in terrorem clauses are generally enforceable "unless the
beneficiary had probable cause the bring the proceeding" (citing Restatement (Third) ofProperty (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 8 .5 (2003) );
R., pp. 871 (District Court's decision on appeal finding a probable cause exception-which finding has not been appealed by the
Successor Trustees).

10
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probable cause is required. See Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008)
(“The longstanding rule of this court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first
time on appeal” (citations omitted)). Further, they should be judicially estopped from contravening
their own prior argument that a probable cause limitation should be applied here. See McCallister
v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013) (“Judicial estoppel precludes a party from
advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible
with the first” (citations omitted)). Here, the Successor Trustees expressly advocated that Michael
had no probable cause for bringing the Arizona Petition since Sybil owed him absolutely no duties,
which position was adopted by the District Court (obviously to the Successor Trustees’ advantage).
Judicial estoppel is designed “to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate shifting of
positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action,” Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d
597, 600 (2008) (citations omitted).
In any event, the Wyoming case is a minority position and is not followed by other
jurisdictions which do impose a probable cause limitation upon enforcement of in terrorum clauses.
(See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 28-29).

Moreover, the Successor Trustees assiduously avoid

acknowledgment that their own breach of fiduciary duty precipitated the need to file the Arizona
Petition and impeded proper administration of the Trust by, thereby impeding Michael’s ability to
ascertain the nature, identity and value of assets in the Survivor’s Trust and his ability to ascertain
whether or not Sybil had properly allocated Trust assets following Roger’s death and whether she
had properly administered such allocated assets consistent with her express duties under the Trust
Agreement. The Successor Trustees also totally ignore and do not respond to Michael’s argument
that he was entitled to discovery concerning the Successor Trustees’ assertion of a lack of probable

11
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cause. The District Court's refusal to consider Michael's argument in this regard constitutes
reversible error.
Finally, the Successor Trustees assert the District Court correctly held that, "Sybil owed no
fiduciary duty to Michael concerning the Survivor's Trust before her death-no duty to account and
no duty to preserve any assets in the Trust" and that "no probable cause exist for Michael to bring
a breach of fiduciary duty action against Sybil's estate." (Respondents' Brief, p. 23). As noted
above, Michael has never asserted that Sybil had a duty to ensure assets would remain in the
Survivor's Trust at her death and the Successor Trustees mislead the Court by suggesting that
Michael made or is now making that argument. Rather, Michael has consistently argued that the
existence of duties to beneficiaries is an inherent and fundamental component of all trusts and that
a trust without any duties is pure fiction. 17 As argued in Appellant's Brief, a trustee has many
duties-a duty to keep proper records, a duty to act fairly with respect to the interest of beneficiaries
and a duty to keep trust beneficiaries reasonably informed, among others-and all of these duties
exist as long as there are assets in the trust. The Successor Trustees argue that, "[t]aken to its logical
conclusion, Michael's arguments would take away the ability of grantors of revocable living trusts
to retain broad discretion over trust assets during their lifetime."

18

They also argue implicitly that

Sybil's right to invade the trust corpus for her own support and personal needs absolved her of her
duty to avoid self-dealing contrary to the terms of the Trust and of her duty to act impartially with

17

"A settlor who attempts to create a trust without any accountability in the trust is contradicting himself." Bogart and
Bogart, The Law of Trust, § 673 (Rev. 2d. Ed. 1993).
18
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respect to the rights of all trust beneficiaries. 19 Stripped to its essence, the Successor Trustees are
arguing that Sybil owed no duties to any of the Trust beneficiaries and that she was free to deal with
Trust assets as she pleased, regardless of her express and inherent duties in the Trust. If Sybil had
the right to ignore all of her Trust duties, then the Trust would be pure fiction. Sybil's right to invade
Trust corpus for her own purposes did not in any way absolve her from the duty to act fairly toward
the Trust beneficiaries or from her duty to avoid self dealing in a manner that was inconsistent with
the terms of the Trust. The Trust beneficiaries' rights were subject to the terms and conditions set
forth in the Trust, including Sybil's right to invade the Trust corpus for her own purposes. Sybil's
resort to the Trust corpus for her own personal needs was expressly permitted by the Trust and her
exercise of that right would not in any way have contravened the interests of the beneficiaries that
were subject to such rights.
Did Sybil have the fiduciary duty to avoid self-dealing in a manner contrary to the express
terms of the Trust? Of course she did. A simple hypothetical will illustrate the point. Suppose Sybil
disagreed with the Trust dispositive provisions pertaining to the Marital Trusts (i.e., Roger's share
of the community property and his separate property). Did she, as the Successor Trustees argue,
have "absolute discretion to modify the terms of her will to change the recipients of the assets of the
trust at any time?"2°Following the Successor Trustees' argument, Sybil had the "absolute discretion"
to ignore§ 5.02 of the Trust and allocate all assets of the Trust to the Survivor's Trust, based upon
her ability to alter her Will. In fact, had Sybil done that, it would have been a clear breach of her
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duty to avoid self dealing and to act fairly with respect to the rights of the beneficiaries of the Trust. 21
In sum, Roger and Sybil did not intend to create a fictional or illusory trust. The Successor

Trustees' arguments that no duties were owed to the Trust beneficiaries based upon Sybil's
"absolute discretion" to use Trust assets as she pleased flies squarely in the face of§ 20.05(p) of the
Trust which recognizes the existence of Trustee fiduciary duties. 22 Once again, the District Court's
conclusion that no duties were owed to any of the beneficiaries is reversible error.
IV.

Based upon the Successor Trustees' Breach of Their Duties to Provide Access to
Relevant Information, They Should Be Estopped from Enforcement of the Forfeiture
Clause.

Under the equitable maxim that, "He who seeks equity must do equity," the Successor
Trustees should be barred from asserting application of the Forfeiture Clause because of their breach
of duty to provide Michael with relevant information concerning administration of the Trust. In
response, the Successor Trustees claim that they"providedhim [Michael] aninventoryofthe Trusts
assets as of Sybil's death and an interim accounting from the time the Successor Trustees became
Trustees and a large amount of underlying financial records, from which the information for the

inventory and accounting were drawn. ,m By their own admission, the inventory and interim
accounting related only to the period after Sybil's death. As noted above, the record is undisputed
that the Trustees would not disclose or allow access to any financial records concerning Trust
administration prior to Sybil's death. They also argue that they and their counsel met with Michael

21
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and his attorney to "answer any other questions Michael might have concerning financial matters
relating to the Survivor's Trust "since the Successor Trustees became Trustees." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 24). Further, their claim that they provided Michael a "significant amount ofrecords and
financial information about the Survivor's Trust and its records were drawn"24 is belied by their
admission that all such information related solely to the period after Sybil's death. Specifically, they
acknowledge that, "All of the information provided to Michael was for the period from and
after Sybil's death. 25 Paradoxically, they claim that, "Michael has admitted he has no evidence that
Sybil breached any fiduciary duty owed to him," 26 when in fact they denied him access to Trust
records kept prior to Sybil's death from which Michael could determined if Sybil had properly
allocated Trust assets or had otherwise properly fulfilled her duties as a trustee. They also claim that,
"Michael initiated court action to try to pressure and intimidate the Successor Trustees into
complying with his unreasonable demands despite the fact that he has no legal or equitable claim
related to the Trust before Sybil's death."27 Such statement also has no support whatsoever in the
record. In fact the evidence before this Court is directly to the contrary. Without dispute the Record
reflects that the Arizona Petition was filed solely to prevent the Arizona limitation period from
running during the pendency of this action and that the Successor Trustees stipulated to a stay of the
Arizona proceeding pending the resolution of this action. 28 Having no support in the Record, their
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argument that Michael initiated court action to pressure and intimidate the Trustees into complying
with his unreasonable demands borders upon bad faith. Moreover, the Successor Trustees did not
dispute Mr. Famam's Affidavit stating that the sole purpose for bringing the Arizona Petition was
to prevent the running of the Arizona statute oflimitations pending the resolution of this action. 29
The Successor Trustees inconsistently argue that Michael's action in filing the Arizona
Petition, "is precisely the kind of action that Roger and Sybil sought to discourage when they
included item (c) in the Forfeiture Provision. " 30 If the Successor Trustees' argument is correct, then
why would Roger and Sybil include numerous provisions in the Trust expressly imposing fiduciary
duties on the Trustee if they intended the Forfeiture Clause could be used to undermine or prevent
enforcement of those very same duties. Yet, that is exactly what the Successor Trustees have done
here.
Further, they make the statement that, "Michael refuses to believe the information that the
Successor Trustees already have provided although he has no evidence indicating that the
information is not accurate."31 Michael in fact has the right to challenge the Trustees' Inventory and
Initial Accounting-such right is inherent within Trust and statutory provisions preserving access
to Trust Administration records. 32 Such access rights would be totally meaningless if there was no
right to contest the Trustees' claims. The reason Michael has only limited evidence of Sybil's
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See R., p. 599 (Aff. of Robert Farnam, ,i 8).

30
31

see Respondents' Brief, pp. 14-15.
See Respondents' Brief, p. 24.

32

See Idaho Code § 15-7-303; Bogert, George T., TRUSTS, § 141 (6th ed. 1987) ("The trustee is under a duty to furnish to
the beneficiary on demand all information regarding the trust and its execution which may be useful to the beneficiary in protecting
his rights, and to give to the beneficiary facts which the trustee knows or ought to know would be important to the beneficiary.")
(emphasis added).

16

-

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

administration of the Survivor's Trust is because the Successor Trustees wrongfully refused and
continue to refuse to grant Michael access to relevant Trust administrative records kept and
maintained prior to Sybil's death. The Successor Trustees' argument here is hypocrisy at its worst.
Inherent within the statutory provisions and clauses in the Trust regarding access to relevant
information is the notion that beneficiaries are entitled to disbelieve and challenge inventories and
accountings prepared by trustees. It is particularly so in this case, because the Successor Trustees
have an inherent conflict of interest because they were beneficiaries of both the Marital Trusts and
the Survivor's Trust, whereas Michael was a beneficiary only of the latter.
Finally, in response to the Successor Trustees' contention that, "Michael will continue to
engage in such conduct (i.e., requesting access to "relevant" Trust records?), to the detriment of all
other Trust beneficiaries,"33 Michael would ask how his request to review relevant Trust records is
detrimental to the interest of Trust beneficiaries when he has that right, as do all other beneficiaries?
How is Michael's insistence that Sybil owed fiduciary duties to all beneficiaries detrimental to their
interests? Roger and Sybil clearly intended to allow such access and to impose fiduciary duties upon
the trustee and the Successor Trustees are now attempting to subvert those rights by their resort to
the Forfeiture Clause.

V.

The District Court Erred in Holding That Sybil Owed No Fiduciary Duty in Her
Capacity as Trustee of the Survivor's Trust.
Michael will not here repeat his argument that a trust which imposes no fiduciary duties on

the trustee is illusory and no trust at all. 34 Yet the District Court essentially made that erroneous
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conclusion when it conflated the difference between a will and a trust in order to justify its
conclusion that the Trust imposed no fiduciary duties upon the Trustee (in this case Sybil).
Admittedly, a will does not impose fiduciary duties upon the testator; however the same is not true
relative to a trust, which inherently imposes fiduciary duties upon its trustees.
The foregoing aside, Michael will respond to the Successor Trustees’ argument that the Carl
H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 97 (1999) supports their “no
duties” argument. In Christensen, Carl and Lenna Christensen established a revocable living trust
into which a substantial amount of real property as well as their bank accounts, farm equipment,
livestock and personal effects were placed. Christensen, 133 Idaho at 868, 993 P.2d at 1199.
Approximately three years after the trust creation, one of the sons, Forest Christensen, approached
his parents about buying the 900 acre family farm which included their personal residence. Id. Carl
and Lenna’s attorney, Steve Fuller, drew up a contract of sale providing for a sale of the family farm
to Forest and Byron Kelly who was the Christensen’s family dentist. Id. at 868-69, 993 P.2d at
1199-1200. Several days after the closing, Lenna advised Fuller that she was unhappy with the deal
because she did not realize that Byron was receiving a fifty percent interest in the farm or that farm
equipment was included in the sale. Id. at 869, 993 P.2d at 1200. She also testified that she did not
realize that Fuller had represented her at the closing of the sale. Id. Approximately seven months
after the closing, Lenna and five of her other children commenced an action to set aside the contract,
alleging that husband, Carl, was incompetent and incapable of giving an intelligent consent to the
transaction. Id.
Following a motion for summary judgment by Forest, the District Court granted summary
judgment in Forest’s favor on the basis that Lenna and her five other children were not real parties

18

–

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

in interest to the Contract of Sale under I.R.C.P. 17(a). Id. at 869-70, 993 P.2d at 1200-01. The coplaintiffs asserted that as beneficiaries of the family trust they were entitled to pursue such action.
Id. at 870, 993 P.2d at 1201. The Supreme Court rejected that contention on the basis that the coplaintiffs were merely contingent beneficiaries and they were not entitled to challenge the
enforceability of a contract of sale to which they were not parties. Id. at 870-71, 993 P.2d at 120102.
There are some rather obvious differences between the case at hand and Christensen. First,
and most importantly, Christensen was not a case involving an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by
a trustee. Rather, it was a case brought by the contingent beneficiaries of a trust seeking to set aside
a transaction between one of the grantors’ sons and the co-trustees, Carl and Lenna Christensen.
Thus, the case did not in any way address the rights of a residual beneficiary to enforce trust
provisions included in a trust of which they were a specific beneficiary. Christensen stands only for
the proposition that contingent beneficiaries have no standing to challenge a duly constituted
Trustee’s administrative actions while their interest is still contingent. However, in this case when
Michael filed his Arizona action, his interest was not contingent—rather his residual interest in the
Trust at that time was fully vested and absolute.
Thus, the Christensen case is wholly inapposite because the issue at hand here involves the
rights of a fully vested residual beneficiary to enforce provisions of at trust of which he is a named
beneficiary against the trustees. Furthermore, unlike Christensen, Michael became a fully vested
beneficiary upon Sybil’s death unlike the beneficiaries in Christensen who held only contingent,
hypothetical interests. Michael became a residual beneficiary of the Trust immediately upon his
mother’s execution of her power of appointment and such residual interest became absolute once

19

–

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

Sybil died. On appeal, the District Court here correctly recognized Michael’s status as a beneficiary
and the Successor Trustees have not challenged that determination. Michael’s claim against Sybil,
if ultimately brought, would be based upon his rights as a fully vested beneficiary of the Survivor’s
Trust. Unlike Christensen, where the siblings were not parties to the contract of sale at issue,
Michael was a fully vested beneficiary of the Trust at the time the Arizona action was filed and as
such any action against Sybil’s estate would necessarily be based upon his rights as a fully vested
beneficiary under the Trust instrument.
Once again, the Successor Trustees’ arguments are specious because they are in essence
arguing that Sybil, as trustee of the Trust, owed no duties to the beneficiaries of the Trust—a
proposition which would make the Trust illusory, as has been pointed out previously. Michael’s
claim, if ultimately brought, would not be based upon a claim of a specific interest in Trust assets,
rather his claim would be based upon a breach of fiduciary duty under the express terms of the
Trust—a Trust of which he was without dispute a named beneficiary. The Successor Trustees’
reliance upon the Christensen case is therefore wholly misplaced.
VI.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Address Michael’s Contention That He Was
Entitled to Pursue Discovery in Order to Defend Against the Successor Trustees’ Claim
That He Had No Probable Cause to Commence the Arizona Petition.
As previously noted in Michael’s Appellant’s Brief, the District Court failed to address

Michael’s assertion that he was entitled to pursue discovery concerning Trust administration in order
to respond to the Trustees’ affirmative defense that he had no probable cause to commence the
Arizona Petition. The District Court simply ignored that argument and held that since he had no
probable cause to bring the Arizona action, the Forfeiture Clause was applicable. The District Court
erred in failing to recognize that the Successor Trustees put the probable cause question into issue

20

–

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

when they amended their Answer and that the Successor Trustees’ subsequent refusal to respond to
the discovery concerning their own affirmative defense wrongfully deprived Michael of the ability
to defend against their contentions.
Here the Successor Trustees essentially follow the District Court’s approach—ignore the
discovery issue and hope that it will go away. Specifically, they ignore the fact that they raised the
probable cause issue themselves and that it was their refusal to allow discovery which precipitated
Michael’s inability to respond to their new defense. The Trustees cannot have it both ways—if they
are going to raise the probable cause issue as a defense to Michael’s claim of entitlement to review
Trust records, they cannot then deprive Michael of the right to pursue discovery relevant to the
Successor Trustees’ probable cause claims.
CONCLUSION
By now it should be clear that the Successor Trustees breached their duty to allow Michael
access to relevant Trust records. Had the Successor Trustees fully complied with their duty, the
Arizona Petition may or may not have been warranted, depending upon whether or not Sybil
complied with her fiduciary duties owed to all of the beneficiaries, including Michael. The
Successor Trustees should not be allowed to breach their duties as Trustees to provide access to
relevant information and then claim the Forfeiture Clause is applicable because Michael has no
probable cause to commence the Arizona Petition. The Successor Trustees are speaking out of both
sides of their mouths.
Michael would again ask the question that goes to the heart of this action: What are the
Successor Trustees trying to hide? Is it their fraudulent transfer of the Survivor's Trust's interest in

21

–

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

Sybil's Quail Ridge lot and residence? 35 What happened to Sybil's interest in the real estate holding
company known as Interchange Holdings, LLC? Why did the Successor Trustees fail to include the
Interchange Holdings, LLC, investment in the Initial Inventory and what was the basis for their
valuation of such investment in Sybil's federal estate tax retum? 36 Why do the Successor Trustees
refuse to explain what happened to Sybil's interest in Four Peaks Properties, LLC, which was
another real estate investment company with vast real estate holdings in Arizona and which was once
owned by Roger and Sybil as community property? 37 Why won't the Successor Trustees explain the
reason for their payment of $20,264 for "Kathy Williams car" out of the assets of the Survivor's
Trust, when Kathy Williams was not even a beneficiary of the Survivor's Trust. 38
All of these assets and others were part of Roger and Sybil's vast financial empire that
Michael estimates was valued at over seventy million dollars in 1986. 39 What happened to these
assets? Although these looming questions focus primarily upon the Successor Trustees' actions
following Sybil's death, without knowing how Sybil allocated such assets between the Survivor's
Trust and the Marital Trusts or what she did with such assets once so allocated, Michael has no way
of knowing whether or not such assets were part of the Survivor's Trust of which he is a beneficiary.
Such allocation and Sybil's subsequent administration is quite clearly "relevant information" and
the Successor Trustees' refusal to provide such information, under the circumstances, is very suspect.
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As pointed out in Michael's Affidavit, there are many reasons to question the accuracy of the
Initial Inventory prepared by the Successor Trustees. 40 Only full and complete access to all Trust
administrative records will resolve those questions and the Trustees' refusal to provide such access
casts grave doubt as to whether or not the Trust here has been properly administered. One of the
most fundamental duties owed by a trustee to a beneficiary is the right to review trust administrative
records. 41 The Trustees' actions in this case here fly squarely in the face of that right.
The matter should be remanded to the Magistrate Court with an order to allow inspection of
all relevant Trust records consistent with Idaho Code § 15-7-303(b) and§ 18.10 of the Trust, as well
as I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of September, 2019.
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